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Discursive hegemonyIntergovernmental organisations have developed into important sites of normative contestation where increas-
ingly non-state actors participate. A common puzzle is however whether engaged non-state actors represent al-
ready strong and established interests or if they also bring forth marginalised voices. This concern raises the
pertinent question of what views non-state actors actually represent and if this adds to the perspectives voiced
by state actors. This paper examines the views held and voiced by state and a range of non-state participants
at the United Nation's climate change conferences. Speciﬁcally, questions on what types of climate change solu-
tions are favoured and towhat extent these solutions are discussed are addressed. Through statistical analyses of
questionnaire data and a content analysis of abstracts of side-events to the conferences, we ﬁnd that while non-
state actors help in broadening the discursive space, some perspectives remain marginalised. We conclude that
while non-state actors represent a pluralising force, greater non-state actor participation in intergovernmental
organisations is on its own unlikely to lead to democratic global governance.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Climate change is an area that is fraught with normative contesta-
tion on the appropriate modes of solutions. One fault line has been be-
tween proponents ofmarket solutions and those favouring government
regulations. Other discussions include the role of technological
innovations, lifestyle changes and new economic models (Dryzek and
Stevenson, 2011). A major challenge for climate change governance is
therefore how to integrate diverse interests and perspectives in a
legitimate and accountable manner in global norm-setting (Biermann
and Gupta, 2011; Spagnuolo, 2011; Steffek and Hahn, 2010). As the in-
tergovernmental negotiations on climate change have stalled in recent
years, there has been a growing realisation that a range of solutions
and the involvement of multiple actors are necessary to tackle climate
change (e.g. Blok et al., 2012). In this context, the involvement of non-
state actors in offering and implementing solutions has been recognised
(Nasiritousi et al., 2014).
Non-state actors1 are a diverse set of actors that are transforming the
international system by participating in governance functions atdies:Water and Environmental
esearch, Linköping University,
: +46 11 36 34 97.
ritousi), mattias.hjerpe@liu.se
oup that is not a sovereign state
groups.
. This is an open access article underdifferent levels. Despite often lacking an ofﬁcial role in the international
political system, non-state actors can through processes of cooperation
and contestation shape how issues are framed and acted upon (Nye,
1990; Sikkink, 2002). In particular, the participation of non-state actors
in multilateral cooperation has been suggested as a way of reducing the
democratic deﬁcit that international rule-making is perceived to suffer
from (Biermann and Gupta, 2011). Some scholars even view their par-
ticipation as a basis for global deliberative democracy as they can con-
tribute to voicing plural discourses and offer alternative perspectives
to states (Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011; Nanz and Steffek, 2005;
Sikkink, 2002).
However, concerns have been raised that non-state actors partici-
pating in global politics act as elitist interest groups that lobby at the in-
ternational level (Holmes, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2005). A related
concern is whether the active non-state actors represent already strong
and established interests or if they also bring forth marginalised voices,
i.e. whether they reinforce mainstream views or contribute with
progressive ideas (Hjerpe and Buhr, 2014; Dryzek and Stevenson,
2011; Nordang Uhre, 2013). The pertinent question of what views
non-state actors represent has important implications for the thesis
that non-state actors in fact contribute to democratising global gover-
nance, and thus requires empirical investigation.
To examine whether non-state actors represent and voice plural
perspectives in international affairs, we focus on the multilateral cli-
mate change negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCCthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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ent geographical locations interested in awide range of issues related to
climate change (Hjerpe and Linnér, 2010; Depledge, 2005; Nasiritousi
and Linnér, 2014; Schroeder and Lovell, 2012). This makes it a reward-
ing empirical setting for exploring the democratic potential of non-state
actors, e.g. environmental NGOs, business groups, research organisa-
tions, intergovernmental organisations, and indigenous peoples organi-
sations. With non-state actors at times outnumbering state party
participants, scholars have sought to understand their roles in the cli-
mate change conferences (Betsill, 2008; Lovell, 2007; Nasiritousi and
Linnér, 2014; Newell, 2000). As some aim to inﬂuence the
negotiations, it is of interest to understand what opinions they
represent. Nevertheless, few have sought to systematically analyse
what views non-state actors hold and voice. While ofﬁcial participant
lists reveal that they come from diverse geographical and epistemic
origins, participants' views with respect to general discourses and pre-
ferred solutions to the climate change problem have not received ade-
quate scholarly attention. We suggest that an empirical investigation
of participants' views furthers our understanding of the extent to
which non-state actors contribute to pluralising global governance by
offering alternative perspectives to states.
This paper aims to empirically explore views held and voiced by
state and a range of non-state actors on how climate change should be
addressed at two recent Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC.
After reviewing the literature on the democratic potential of non-state
actors in global governance, we analyse results from a questionnaire
handed out to participants at COP-17 in Durban (2011) and COP-18 in
Doha (2012). We also perform a content analysis of abstracts of side-
events arranged at the COPs in 2009–2012. The paper thereby empiri-
cally assesses differences of opinion between states and groups of
non-state actors on effective climate change solutions, and examines
to what extent these solutions are voiced by conference participants
hosting side-events.
2. Democratic Implications of Non-State Actor Participation
Globalisation processes have given rise to several governance
challenges for states, not least the need to coordinate actions that
have signiﬁcant impacts beyond sovereign jurisdictions (Cerny, 2010).
One way in which states have sought to tackle global problems, such
as climate change, is to delegate responsibility to intergovernmental or-
ganisations (IGOs). These have, however, been criticised on the grounds
of deﬁcient accountability and democratic legitimacy (Haas, 2004).
While more states are democratising, the growing importance of IGOs
for international rule-making means that many decisions are taken
with aweak chain of electoral accountability. Thus the traditional liberal
models of democracy may not provide adequate democratic appeal in
an age of globalisation (Scholte, 2002).
The increasing participation of non-state actors in the work of IGOs,
it has been argued, could provide a remedy to the democratic deﬁcit
(Dingwerth, 2007; Scholte, 2004; Steffek and Nanz, 2008; Tallberg and
Uhlin, 2011). This argument does not remain uncontested, however.
Critics argue that non-state actors may subvert existing democratic
processes and may themselves be undemocratic (Anderson and Rieff
2005; Brühl, 2010; Steffek and Hahn, 2010). Nevertheless, amongst
scholars who believe that global democracy is possible, two ideal-
types to democratic governance perceive a role for non-state actors in
contributing to democratising global governance: global stakeholder
democracy and transnational deliberative democracy (Bäckstrand,
2011).While agreeing on the importance of accountability, participation,
and transparency, they differ in their descriptions of how global democ-
racy can be achieved. Global stakeholder democracy focuses on
institutionalising the participation of relevant stakeholders in decision-
making (Macdonald, 2008). Transnational deliberative democracy, on
the other hand, stresses the importance of public spheres of deliberation
that allow multiple perspectives to be considered before decisions aremade (Dryzek, 2009; Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011; Nanz and Steffek,
2005; Smith and Brassett, 2008).
In other words, while global stakeholder democracy emphasises the
importance of including relevant stakeholders in order to give voice to
those affected by decisions, the transnational deliberative democracy
models that promote discursive democracy instead speak of open and
inclusive discursive space (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012). One reason
for why the emphasis is not placed on the inclusion of stakeholders in
the latter view is because many global issues affect a vast number of
stakeholders, since global decisions can have signiﬁcant impacts on
people's lives. Climate change is an illuminating example of an issue
where almost anyone could be considered a stakeholder. Discursive
democracy therefore suggests that the physical presence of all stake-
holders is not key, but instead requires the inclusion of a plurality of
perspectives so that many views can be considered (Dryzek and
Stevenson, 2011).
This conception of discursive democracy is not unproblematic
however. While it has been argued that plural perspectives should be
represented and channelled into decision-making for enhancing demo-
cratic legitimacy (Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011), the relative weight
given to the perspectives may vary. Questions have been raised regard-
ing whether mainstream perspectives should be given equal weight as
marginalised perspectives, or whether relative weights should be
given to perspectives that reﬂect their underlying support amongst
the public (ibid). A related question is whether it is possible to decouple
the agents participating in global forums from the perspectives voiced.
According to Holmes (2011: 3), “Struggles in environmental politics
are battles to assert discursive hegemony: to ensure that one's own
storyline is taken to be the authoritative, accepted version, forming
the basis for policy.” This implies that particular discourses or perspec-
tives may be tied to particular actors.
A pertinent question in establishing the democratic effects of greater
non-state actor participation is thus whether these actors are best
described through a De Tocquevillian or a Gramscian approach. The
former views civil society actors as a democratising force assuming
them to facilitate discourse and interest articulation and thereby
improve representation. The latter views civil society actors as repro-
ducing existing patterns of power and political contestation, thereby
simply adding to struggles that already occur in the political sphere
(Clarke, 1998). The proliferation of non-state actors has often been de-
scribed according to the De Tocquevillian perspective. However, several
studies have questioned the rosy picture of non-state actors and call for
more empirical research into their nature and activities (Bexell et al.,
2010; Steffek and Hahn, 2010). Issues that have not received adequate
scrutiny are whether non-state actors contribute to pluralising views
and the relative weight of the perspectives that they voice, which we
explore below in the context of climate change.
3. Non-State Actor Participation in the UNFCCC
The international climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC
have in recent years turned into ‘mega-conferences’ that annually
attract thousands of participants. Because these negotiations draw the
largest non-state actor interest amongst all international environmental
agreements and because such a broad range of issues are discussed, it
represents a good case for studying non-state actor views. The relative
openness of the climate change regime to non-state actor participation
(Nasiritousi and Linnér, 2014) provides space to non-state actors to play
a number of roles, such as information-sharing, capacity building and
implementation, and rule-setting (Andonova et al., 2009; Nasiritousi
et al., 2014). Therefore, if non-state actors contribute to democratising
global governance, the international climate change conferences
would be the place to study its effects.
According to Dryzek and Stevenson (2011), the international cli-
mate change conferences contribute to a model for global democracy.
Their study of deliberative practices at the UNFCCC concludes that
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putative or compromised form” (Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011, pp.
1873). Their study provides a ﬁrst assessment of climate discourses
voiced at climate change side-events. They conclude that the range of
perspectives, some of which are critical to mainstream orientations, “is
one indication of vibrant public space” (Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011,
pp.1869). Their conclusions however do not offer a quantiﬁcation of
how pronounced the different perspectives are and their analysis is
built on data from one year (2009).
According to the Gramscian view we should not only be concerned
about whether all perspectives are heard but also pay attention to
their relative weight. How do we know that some perspectives do not
receive disproportionate space compared to others so as to undermine
democratic legitimacy? Recent studies have documented that radical
environmental ideas (Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011) and topics such as
fossil fuels and heavily CO2-emitting industries (Hjerpe and Buhr,
2014) were largely absent from the debate in ofﬁcial UNFCCC side-
events. Moreover, Nordang Uhre (2013) concluded a strong numerical
dominance of UNFCCC observer organisations from Europe and North
America. This literature suggests that some perspectives may remain
marginalised despite the participation of a signiﬁcant number of non-
state actors in intergovernmental proceedings, perhaps as a result of
marginalised groups being less organised, which is more in line with
the Gramscian than the De Tocquevillian approach.
In this paper, we argue that an empirical investigation of views
found in the negotiations furthers our understanding of the extent to
which non-state actors contribute to democratising global governance.
Speciﬁcally, we suggest that it is important to study the relative weight
of views to establish not only to what extent discursive heterogeneity
exists but also whether the perspectives voiced match the level of pref-
erence held for those perspectives.
We do this by studying views on broad policy measures to tackle
climate change effectively amongst participants involved in climate
change governance. Recurrent discussions in the climate change negoti-
ations concern the role of government action (such as regulations and
subsidies), marketmechanisms (such as carbonmarkets), technological
innovation (such as renewable energy), new economic models (such
as low-emission development pathways), and lifestyle changes
(such as education and sustainable consumption and production)
(e.g. IISD, 2013). In this paper we ask: to what extent are these solu-
tions favoured by different actors and (how) do non-state actors
contribute to the voicing of plural perspectives on effective solutions
to climate change?
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst consider the degree of diversity of views held
amongst different actors at the international climate change confer-
ences on the issue of most effective solutions to climate change. Second,
we consider the degree of diversity of views voiced by examining the
modes of solutions propagated by a range of actors. This allows us to
assess both towhat extent views amongst different participants diverge
depending on their primary role at the conference and whether the
views voiced reﬂect the diversity of views held. In other words, we ex-
amine whether the supply of perspectives on climate change solutions
voiced corresponds to the demand for these solutions by participants
at the UNFCCC side-events.
The focus on views held and voiced in this study is based on consid-
eration for the impact on democratic quality that non-state actors can
make without being dependent on the actions of states. Nanz and
Steffek (2005) have developed four criteria for evaluating the
democratic quality of deliberative practices: “access to information
and to deliberative settings, the transparency of the policy process, re-
sponsiveness to concerns voiced by non-state actors and the inclusion
of all relevant concerns into deliberation”. While the ﬁrst three largely
depend on the institutional context and often cannot be determined
by non-state actor agency, the latter can be affected by non-state actors
through fuelling debates and considering relevant perspectives on dif-
ferent issues. Accordingly, non-state actors' submissions of alternativearguments can contribute to democratic practices. Diversity of views
is therefore an important criterion for democratic quality.
This article suggests thatwhile the variety of perspectives represent-
ed by both governments and non-state actors at the intergovernmental
negotiations contributes to the pluralisation of climate change gover-
nance, it does not necessarily contribute to its democratisation. Accord-
ing to Cerny (2010: 20) “pluralisation is not a proxy for true
democratisation in the way it has traditionally been depicted, and it
can morph into nondemocratic or only pseudodemocratic forms too.”
In particular, issues of representativeness of actors and the views voiced,
and the extent to which particular perspectives dominate the formal
decision-making arena, can hamper non-state actors' democratic poten-
tial. While we do not explicitly address the representativeness of actors
or look for solution modes in the ofﬁcial texts of the UNFCCC, our focus
on both the views held and voiced allows us to compare congruence
between preferences for solutions and the level of discussion of those
solutions in an international setting. Moreover, we examine whether
the views of non-state actors signiﬁcantly differ from that of state actors
to counterbalance dominant perspectives as in the De Tocquevillian
approach or whether they reinforce existing perspectives as in the
Gramscian approach.
The public space thatwill be the focus of the study is the ofﬁcial side-
events of the UNFCCC. Side-events attract a diverse set of actors that
have an interest in the climate change issue and are a forum for non-
state actors to voice their proposals and concerns (Hjerpe and Linnér,
2010; Lovell, 2007; Schroeder and Lovell, 2012). Applications for
organising side-events have risen to the point that demand for timeslots
outstrips supply and in recent years the UNFCCC Secretariat have allo-
cated side-events based on a set of selection criteria (UNFCCC, 2013).
The participation of non-state actors at side-events has contributed to
raising issues that have later found their way onto the agenda of the
negotiations. For example, ideas vented at side-events on issues like ad-
aptation to climate change and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD) have contributed to raising their status
in the negotiations.
This paper therefore conducts a quantitative study to explore the
diversity of views held and voiced at recent side-events of the UNFCCC
COPs. The quantiﬁcation of views amongst state and non-state actors
allows us to analyse whether the pluralisation of actors has led to
pluralisation of perspectives in the public space, and whether there is
discursive diversity or discursive hegemony on solutions to climate
change. In order to examine the spectrum of views held and voiced by
participants at side-events, we employ a two-pronged approach, as
described in the next section.
4. Data and Measures
In order to provide an empirical account of discursive diversity and
to make the material manageable, we have delimited the study to one
speciﬁc topic, namely solutions to climate change. The views held and
voiced at the side-events of the UNFCCC are gauged by a) a survey
measuring the preferences of different categories of non-state and
state representatives in the intergovernmental negotiations on climate
change on the solutions they deem necessary for effectively tackling
the climate change issue and b) a quantitative content analysis of the
extent towhich these solutions arementioned in the abstracts of ofﬁcial
side-events.
To capture the degree of diversity of views held amongst different
actors involved in climate change governance, we retrieve the prefer-
ences on ﬁve primary types of solutions from responses to a question-
naire. The questionnaire surveyed participants in 28 ofﬁcial side-
events during COP-17 and COP-18. The questionnaires produced a
total of 834 responses. The side-events targeted for this study were
chosen based on criteria to ensure balance in the types of organisers
and the topics of the side-events. The self-administered surveys were
distributed to participants as they entered the side-event room and
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collected at more than 100 side-events since COP-13 in Bali (Hjerpe
and Linnér, 2010).
The broad policy measures used to gauge the views of participants
on the most effective solutions to climate change were chosen based
on a categorisation of solutions proposed at the UNFCCC (e.g. IISD,
2013) and in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) re-
ports (e.g.Metz et al., 2007). Thequestion reads: “Towhat extent do you
agree with each of these statements? Indicate on a scale of 1–7 how
each statement corresponds with your view: (1) means disagree
strongly and (7) agree strongly. Climate change ismost effectively tack-
led through: a) Technological innovations, b) Market mechanisms,
c) Government regulation, d) New economic models valuing sustain-
ability, e) Lifestyle changes.”2 This question is therefore designed to
capture participants' views on the most common types of solutions
proposed to ﬁght climate change. We conducted two-sample Student's
t-tests assuming equal variances to examinewhether there were signif-
icant differences between the answers for the two years of the question-
naire, but found no such signiﬁcant differences except for the question
of lifestyle changes (p = 0.047). This difference is likely to stem from
the change in the question wording (see footnote 2), producing a
slightly higher mean for the lifestyle changes option at COP-18 (5.55)
compared to COP-17 (5.31).With the differences being small, we decid-
ed to pool the data from the two years.
To explore whether the answers are dependent on the type of
respondent, Pearson's chi-squared test was used. Using this test we
examine whether types of actors differ in the frequency with which
they report that they agree with a particular solution to climate change.
Because the data is skewed towards agreement, the data needs to be
transformed before the test is undertaken. Therefore the responses are
collapsed into two categories: Agreement (responses 5–7 on the Likert
scale) and Disagreement or Neither agree/disagree (responses 1–4 on
the Likert scale).3 For the same reason, categories of primary roles
with few respondents (media, indigenous peoples, and trade unions)
are placed in the ‘Other’ category.
To capture the degree of diversity of views voiced amongst different
actors involved in climate change governance, we analysematerial from
a database that has qualitatively coded all abstracts for side-events
arranged at COPs 15–18. We measure to what extent these solutions
are explicitly referred to in the abstracts as an indication of them
being discussed at the ofﬁcial side-events. This data enables us to
explore what solutions to climate change are most frequently discussed
by state and non-state actors in close proximity to the intergovernmen-
tal negotiations. The analysis was ﬁrst carried out for COP-17 and 18 to
provide comparability with the questionnaire data, and then repeated
for the previous two COPs (COP-15 in Copenhagen 2009 and COP-16
in Cancun2010) to expand the timeline and reduce the impact of poten-
tial differences over time. Thesemay result from the negotiations focus-
ing on certain topics at different times or the COPs being held at
different locations, thereby attracting particular groups of participants.
On average the 959 side-event abstracts contain about 45 words
each. While the limited number of words obviously delimits the possi-
bilities of a more elaborate content analysis, the abstracts are often
very informative as they are the primary means through which the
side-event-host advertises the event to prospective attendees. For
each mode of solutions category we iteratively generated a set of key-
words, which was then used in a quantitative search. We selected and
constructed new categories that corresponded to the ﬁve solution
modes by using sets of search terms outlined in the Appendix A. We
ﬁrst selected similar search terms as in the wording of the survey2 At COP-17, the last option read “Lifestyle changes amongst everyone but the poorest”,
butwas changed to simply “Lifestyle changes” for the COP-18 questionnaire because of the
possibility of misinterpreting the wording.
3 We veriﬁed the results by grouping the answers in alternative categories and obtained
corresponding results in the chi-squared tests.question and then, after having read the side-event abstracts containing
these terms, added other terms that were found in the abstracts.
For the category “New economicmodels”we decided to include two
sub-categories: one that explicitly related to greener or less fossil-
intense economies or societies and one that focused on a more funda-
mentally transformative approach captured by reference to rights and
justice. This is intended to capture values and ideas that emphasise
alternative ways to organise society. This distinction is made based on
the current discussions on green growth, where one model is more
rooted in current economic models and another emphasises that trans-
formational change is needed to achieve sustainability, including issues
of rights and equity (Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011; Hoffman, 2011). The
coding itself does not reveal in what way the different solution modes
were discussed, i.e. whether the solutions were discussed in a
favourable or a critical light. Rather, the data only presents what issues
were discussed and by whom. The entire abstracts were read in order
to assess in what way the solutions were addressed.
Unlike Dryzek and Stevenson (2011) we also include the views
voiced by state actors at side-events to offer a reference point against
which we can compare the views of non-state actors. The side-event
organisers were thus categorised into the following categories: govern-
ment, public organisation (agencies, initiatives), hybrid (organisations
with state and non-state members), intergovernmental organisations,
business and industry organisations, environmental NGOs, research
organisations (e.g. universities, institutes, think tanks), and other
NGOs (e.g. development NGOs and faith organisations). Both datasets
thus contain information on actor types, categorised in a broad sense,
allowing us to analyse similarities and differences across actor groups.
Thereby we can assess whether non-state actors in fact hold different
preferences to government representatives andwhether observers con-
tribute to broadening perspectives on solutions.
5. Results and Discussion
5.1. Views Held on Modes of Solutions
The results from the questionnaires show that participants generally
agree that all modes of solutions – Technological innovations, Market
mechanisms, Government regulation, New economic models valuing
sustainability, and Lifestyle changes – are important for tackling climate
change. Fig. 1 shows the overall distribution of responses for each
mode of solution for the COP-17 and 18 pooled data.
From Fig. 1, we can see that while all of the proposed solutions
receive a relatively high level of recognition, there are differences in
perceptions of their overall degree of effectiveness. Lifestyle changes,
New economic models and Technological innovations all have a mode of
7, indicating perceptions of high effectiveness. In contrast,Marketmech-
anisms has the lowest mean andmode, implying relatively little trust in
its effectiveness compared with the other four modes of solutions. Gov-
ernment regulation has the highest mean and lowest standard devia-
tions, with the mode being 6, and very few respondents indicating
disagreement, implying perceptions of relatively high effectiveness as
a tool to tackle climate change. It also indicates that governments are
expected to take the lead on climate change through regulation while
there is greater disagreement about the role of market mechanisms.
This ﬁnding makes sense given the high share of COP-participants that
are actively involved in regulatory processes at intergovernmental, na-
tional or subnational levels.
Yet more interesting is whether opinions diverge between different
groups of actors and between different regions. Table 1 shows a cross-
tabulation of solutions favoured by different actor types.
Before turning to the results of the chi-squared test, we note that ne-
gotiators expressed that climate change is most effectively tackled
through New economic models valuing sustainability (agreement
73.6%), national governments, local governments, and intergovernmen-
tal organisations recognised Technological innovations (79.6%, 83.9% and
50% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Lifestyle changes (n=780)
New economic model (n=779)
Government regulaon (n=785)
Market mechanisms (n=770)
Technological innovaons (n=788)
Fig. 1. Frequency distribution of responses to survey question onmost effective climate solutions. Legend: for eachmode of solution the importance ismeasured on a scale from 1 (respon-
dents disagree strongly) to 7 (respondents agree strongly). The share of ‘1’ responses is displayed in deep red to the right in the bar while the share of ‘7’ responses is displayed in deep
green to the left.
Table 1
Cross-tabulation of responses to survey question on most effective climate change solutions by actor type.
Technological innovations Market mechanisms Government regulation New economic models Lifestyle changes
Actor type Disagreement
or neither
agree/disagree
Agreement Disagreement
or neither
agree/disagree
Agreement Disagreement
or neither
agree/disagree
Agreement Disagreement
or Neither
agree/disagree
Agreement Disagreement
or neither
agree/disagree
Agreement
Negotiator 27.0% 73.0% 52.1% 47.9% 31.9% 68.1% 26.4% 73.6% 29.7% 70.3%
National
government
20.4% 79.6% 37.9% 62.1% 20.6% 79.4% 28.8% 71.2% 22.3% 77.7%
Local government 16.1% 83.9% 51.6% 48.4% 19.4% 80.6% 25.0% 75.0% 20.0% 80.0%
Intergovernmental
organisation
15.3% 84.7% 43.1% 56.9% 16.7% 83.3% 17.1% 82.9% 30.4% 69.6%
Business and industry 19.5% 80.5% 17.3% 82.7% 20.7% 79.3% 24.4% 75.6% 37.8% 62.2%
Researcher 19.6% 80.4% 42.2% 57.8% 15.3% 84.7% 21.8% 78.2% 18.8% 81.2%
Environmental NGO 33.7% 66.3% 46.2% 53.8% 18.9% 81.1% 24.1% 75.9% 22.9% 77.1%
Other 33.7% 66.3% 51.6% 48.4% 20.8% 79.2% 24.0% 76.0% 29.9% 70.1%
Pearson's chi-squared
test
p = .005** p = .000** p = .279 p = .816 p = .068*
Legend:ﬁgures in bold indicate highest percentage response for each category of answers onmode of solution. P-numbers at the bottom showwhether the chi-squared testwas signiﬁcant
(marked with * when p b 0.1 and ** when p b 0.01).
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mechanisms as the most effective solutions (82.7%). The other actor
groups – environmental NGOs, researchers and other participants –
view Government regulation as most effective (81.1%, 84.7% and 79.2%,
respectively). Thus there is some diversity of views; in order to analyse
whether the differences are statistically signiﬁcant we turn to the
chi-squared test.
The chi-squared tests show that responses to the Technology (p =
.005),Marketmechanisms (p= .000), and Lifestyle (p= .068) questions
are dependent on actor type. Additional t-tests4 show that environmen-
tal NGOs and the Other category hold views that are statistically
different compared to all other categories on the effectiveness of tech-
nological innovations, and that business groups have less favourable
views on lifestyle changes compared to the rest. The results further
show that business representatives express less negative views on
market mechanisms than the rest—which could be expected. Slightly
surprising, however, is that negotiators (52.1%) and local government
representatives (51.6%) express a low degree of recognition for market
mechanisms as an effective means to tackle climate change. This is
surprising asmarket mechanisms –while being controversial in the ne-
gotiations – have been a central aspect and an important instrument of
the international climate change regime. One reason for this may
be perceptions of poor performance of market-based mechanisms4 Results not shown here, but are available from the authors on request.currently in use, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (Bond,
2012; Torvanger et al., 2013).
Another unexpected ﬁnding perhaps is that responses to the other
questions are independent of actor type. For example, businesses have
traditionally been portrayed as disliking government regulation. Instead
it is negotiators that express the highest disagreement (31.9%) to this
solutionmode. The ﬁndings here show, however, that there is no statis-
tically signiﬁcant association between actor type and agreement with
government regulation.5
While the results show an overall high level of agreement onmodes
of solutions between participants of side-events, the results should be
interpreted cautiously because some actor type categories consist of
few respondents (e.g. local governments, 32 respondents). Further,
the chi-squared test tells us that there is an association between actor
type and responses to the technological innovations and market mech-
anism questions—but it does not tell us the strength of this association.
Further analysis is therefore needed to better understand the views of
participants at international climate change conferences and to mini-
mise the inﬂuence of factors such as location of the COP and timing in
the negotiations.Additional tests indicate that agreement on thesemodes of solutions is independent of
being a national of a developed or developing country, except for Market mechanisms,
where developed (Annex I) countries are more likely to agree to the effectiveness ofMar-
ket mechanisms than respondents from developing (non-Annex I) countries (p = .001).
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an overall high level of agreement on broad policy-measures to tackle
climate change and that some of the main divergences in views lie not
between government representatives and non-state actors—but within
the non-state actor community. Typically the literature has pointed out
strong differences in views on climate change between environmental
groups and business and industry groups. Our results however show
that on the issue of technology solution, the difference is between inter-
governmental organisations and local governments (strong agree-
ment), on the one hand, and environmental NGOs and the Other actor
category (strong disagreement) on the other; on market mechanisms
the difference is between business and industry groups (strong
agreement), and negotiators, local governments and the Other actor
category (strong disagreement); and on lifestyle changes the difference
is between research groups and local governments (strong agreement),
and business and industry groups (strong disagreement). On thewhole,
therefore, the results indicate that the diversity of views on broad
measures for effectively tackling climate change is less pronounced
than expected from the De Toquevillian approach. In order to examine
whether the perspectives expressed at side-events reﬂect these views,
we turn to the results of the content analysis of side-event abstracts.5.2. Views Voiced on Modes of Solutions
Table 2 reports the shares of the 959 COP-15 to COP-18 side-event
abstracts that referred to any or several of the ﬁve modes of solutions
according to actor types hosting the event. New economic models is
here presented as two categories as explained in the methods section.
Overall, the share of the abstracts referring to the Technological innova-
tion mode was the highest (19%). In descending order followed the
modes New economic models (low-carbon economy) (16%), Market
mechanisms (13%), Government regulation (12%), New economic models
(rights and equity) (10%), and, ﬁnally least referred to was Lifestyle
changes (5%). If both categories of New economic models are added to-
gether, the joint category is mentioned in 25% of the abstracts. It then
becomes the most commonly referred to solution mode in the exam-
ined period. The quantiﬁcation demonstrates that while the different
modes of solutions are represented in the side-event arena, the degree
to which they are referred to varies signiﬁcantly.
Next, we explorewhether the overall patternwas evenly distributed
across different side-event-hosts (Table 2). Our data suggest quite large
differences in the share of abstracts referring to the ﬁve modes of
solutions depending on the type of organisation hosting the event.
First, we report the major patterns for each of the ﬁve modes of solu-
tions across actor types (vertically in Table 2) and then we compare
across modes of solutions by actor type (horizontally in Table 2).
The share of abstracts referring to Government regulation has
small variations across side-event-hosts, except for the two smaller
categories public and hybrid organisations. Our examination suggests
that intergovernmental organisations mentioned government regula-
tion less frequently than the other actor types. This suggests thatTable 2
COP 15-18 side-event abstract topics covering the ﬁve modes of solutions according to type of
Actor type Technological
innovations
Market
mechanisms
G
re
Government (n = 177) 16% 11%
Public organisation (n = 23)a 4.3% 4.3%
Hybrid organisation (n = 36)a 31% 25%
Intergovernmental organisation (n = 226) 16% 14%
Business and industry (n = 120) 42% 24%
Research (n = 204) 23% 15%
Environmental NGO (n = 144) 14% 10%
Other NGO (n = 139) 5.7% 6.5%
All (n = 959) 19% 13%
a There were relatively few side-event-hosts in these actor type categories; thus the resultsmany actors take part in the discussion on government regulation,
which may be a sign of general agreement of its importance as a solu-
tion to climate change and most likely a reﬂection of the intergovern-
mental negotiations context.
In contrast, the shares of the four other modes varied much more
signiﬁcantly across side-event-hosts. For instance, Technological innova-
tion issues were referred to about seven times more often in business
and industry hosted side-event abstracts than in abstracts of Other
NGO-organised events. This suggests that the technological innovation
perspective is less diverse in terms of participating actors. Likewise,
the ratio between business and industry and Other NGOs was four
times for Market mechanisms. The ﬁndings indicate an important role
of business and industry in voicing technological- and market issues.
Interestingly, the share of environmental NGO abstracts referring to
Technological innovation andMarket mechanisms are equal to the overall
average. The technological innovations category included abstracts that
referred to speciﬁc forms of renewable energy sources. Environmental
NGO hosts frequently refer to renewables, both in a critical evaluator
sense and as a solution needed to tackle climate change, which contrib-
utes to the largest part of these abstracts (11% out of 14%). Environmen-
tal NGOs also voice a critical perspective on technologies like carbon
capture and storage and emphasise the limits of carbon markets and
ﬂexiblemechanisms. This indicates an important role for environmental
NGOs in broadening the discussion on these solution modes (which
other types of NGOs seem not to have joined at all).
In contrast to the business-dominated discussions on technology and
markets, Lifestyle changes were referred to four times more often in the
abstracts of Other NGO-hosted events than those organised by business
and industry. This implies that the discussion on lifestyle-related issues
is dominated byOther NGOswhereas business and industry and environ-
mental NGOs as well as the smaller actor types of public and hybrid orga-
nisations are largely absent from this relatively limited perspective. The
data indicates that governments, research organisations and intergovern-
mental organisations refer to lifestyle issues as often as the overall aver-
age, indicating participation in the lifestyles discussion.
It follows from these variations that the most and least referred to
modes of solutions differ across actor types. The most commonly
referred to modes of solutions were:
• technological innovation amongst business and industry organisations.
• the two version of new economic models amongst Other NGOs.
• new economic models (low carbon economy) and technological inno-
vation amongst governments and research organisations;
• new economic models (rights and equity), technological innovation
and government regulation amongst environmental NGOs; and
• technological innovation, market mechanisms and new economic
models (low carbon economy) amongst intergovernmental organisa-
tions.
• government regulation, technological innovation and market mecha-
nisms amongst hybrid organisations.
• government regulation and new economicmodels (low carbon econo-
my) amongst public organisations.organiser, %.
overnment
gulation
New economic models:
low carbon economy
New economic models:
rights and equity
Lifestyle
changes
12% 18% 5.1% 5.1%
26% 22% 0.0% 0.0%
33% 11% 0.0% 2.8%
7.1% 13% 0.9% 4.0%
12% 16% 3.3% 2.5%
11% 26% 16% 4.9%
13% 11% 15% 3.5%
10% 19% 29% 10%
12% 16% 10% 4.9%
should be interpreted cautiously.
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most frequent solution types for any actor type. This is in sharp contrast
to the participants' recognition of lifestyle change as an effective
solution to tackle climate change as reported in the previous section. It
is also surprising that lifestyle changes is the least discussedmode of so-
lution, since issues that fall under lifestyle changes – such as education
and awareness – fall directly under the mandate of the UNFCCC, and
because changing individuals' behaviour has been identiﬁed by the
IPCC as an important solution to tackle climate change.
The fact that Market mechanisms only appear amongst the second
most frequent modes of solutions for intergovernmental organisations
and business and industry organisations, is unexpected, since market
mechanisms have been considered an important cornerstone of the
current international climate change regime. The use of newmarket so-
lutions is currently on the agenda of negotiators for inclusion in a future
climate change agreement. Nevertheless, market mechanisms are not
discussed to the extent that could be expected judging by the actual ne-
gotiation text. The results do, however, reﬂect the general feeling
expressed in the questionnaire responses that market mechanisms are
viewed as the least effective solution to tackle climate change.
While New economic models (low carbon economy) are amongst the
most frequent modes of solutions discussed by governments, research
organisations and intergovernmental organisations, the more transfor-
mative notion of New economic models (rights and equity) is expressed
mostly by non-state actors likeOther NGOs (29%), the research commu-
nity (16%) and environmental NGOs (15%). The results therefore
suggest that certain perspectives are more closely associated with
certain actor types and that the presence of observer organisations of
different kinds pluralises the public space.
6. Conclusions
The complexity of climate change and the scope of its implications on
livelihoodsmean that a broad range of non-state actors can, and do, con-
sider themselves as stakeholders. This participation of non-state actors
has been said to contribute to the democratisation of climate change
governance through the articulation of diverse views (Dryzek and
Stevenson, 2011). This paper has sought to assess this claim by exploring
the views held and voiced by different actors participating at UNFCCC
COPs on one pertinent topic, namely solutions to climate change.
Results from both the participant survey and the abstract database
have shown that Government regulation is characterised by relatively
homogeneous views as an effective solution to tackling the climate
change problem, indicated by agreement independent of actor type or
region of origin, and relatively high diversity of voices as all actor
types examined participated in the discussion on government regula-
tion.Market mechanisms, however, is subject to more divisive opinions.
The business group clearly views market mechanisms as relatively more
effective compared to other groups and is also the organiser type that
most frequently voices issues on markets. The largest discrepancy
between views on effective types of solutions and discussions at side-
events lies in the Lifestyle changes category. No side-event organiser had
this solution mode as the most favoured topic for discussion.
This indicates a gap in the topics voiced and highlights a potential
problem of the marginalisation of certain perspectives in the public
space. On the issue of Lifestyle changes, non-state actors have not adopted
the role of advocating an issue that has been identiﬁed as being important
and where there are opportunities to link directly to the discussions tak-
ing place in the negotiation arena.Whether this is due to structural obsta-
cles in terms of access – either because organisations promoting lifestyle
changes are kept out from the public space or do not themselves seek to
participate in discussions – the fact remains that there is a gap in the per-
ceived importance of lifestyle changes as an effective mode of solution
and discussions on lifestyle changes propagated at side-events. One pos-
sible explanation is that side-event organisers seek to voice messages
that they perceive have resonance with the ofﬁcial negotiations, whichcould imply that discussions are steered by the ofﬁcial arena. In contrast,
however, non-state actors have been effective in raising discussions in the
area of rights and equity. Without non-state actor participation, our data
suggest, this perspective would be marginalised.
What are the implications for theories on the democratisation of
global governance? While our data suggest that non-state actors do
contribute to pluralising the views voiced in the public space, the partic-
ipating non-state actors analysed here have not expressed as diverse
views from state parties as the literature on non-state actors has implied
(Biermann and Gupta, 2011; Scholte, 2004). One possible explanation
may be that many non-state actors are funded by or depend on state
actors for their operations, which would support a Gramscian interpre-
tation of civil society as not very distinct from the state sphere.
Instead, we ﬁnd that themain divisions liewithin different groups of
non-state actors, with certain views seen to more closely be associated
with certain groups of non-state actors. This indicates that the composi-
tion of the group of participating non-state actors is important for the
overall balance of ideas voiced. This implies that theremay be structural
obstacles to the democratic potential of non-state actors in terms ofwho
can attend and who can effectively promote certain perspectives.
Whether the De Tocquevillian or the Gramscian approach applies
therefore appears to be linked to options for accessing the public
space, with the current relatively open UNFCCC practices appearing to
facilitate interest articulation, but not necessarily to the extent of ensur-
ing improved representation of all relevant views (Hjerpe and Buhr,
2014; Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011; Nordang Uhre, 2013).
How well these perspectives mirror the views of the wider society
and whether all views are adequately taken into account in the ﬁnal
decision-making are further questions that lie outside the scope of this
paper. In a next step a comparison of the results in this paperwith actual
negotiating textwill provide an indication of the extent towhich certain
views are included in the negotiation dynamics. The emphasis on
market mechanisms in the actual negotiations gives an indication that
views favoured by non-state actors are not weighted equally in the
political bargaining that results in an agreement. The political dynamics
of international negotiations can therefore be another obstacle to the
democratic potential of non-state actors.
Although our data is limited and more systematic studies are
desirable, we tentatively conclude that while non-state actors contribute
to pluralising views at the international level, their participation is on its
own not a solution to the democratic deﬁcit of intergovernmental organi-
sations as it does not appear to promote the type of independent, hetero-
geneous interest articulation as in the De Tocquevillian approach. While
we do not ﬁnd evidence that non-state actors overwhelmingly promote
mainstream ideas, their participation does not appear to promote all
types of perspectives either. This means that some perspectives, such as
life-style changes, remainmarginalised in the public space, despite the in-
clusion of a broad range of actors. Other approaches for widening the
marginalised voice may be needed but are likely to face difﬁculties of
their own (cf. Dryzek et al., 2011). How to integrate diverse interests
and perspectives in a legitimate and accountable manner in global
norm-settingwill therefore remain an important topic for future research.Acknowledgements
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Guidelines for terms that correspond to the alternatives in the survey question. Bold text means that an additional search has been made to double-check the content.
Category Search terms
Technological innovation Technology, technical, innovation, CCS, smart-grid, electric car/vehicle, geo-engineering. Renewable (bio*, hydro, water, wave, dam,
wind, photovoltaic, solar)
Market mechanisms Market (carbon, offset, environmental, ecological, green, energy or voluntary market).Market-based/driven, market actors/infrastructure/
perspectives. Economic instruments,market-based instruments, ﬂexible mechanism, carbon market, permit trading, emissions trading,
cap-and-trade, ETS, CDM, JI
Government regulation Fiscal, tax, subsidy, charge, regulation, command, government, institution*, public
New economic models
(low carbon economy)
Economy, economic (new/green/low-carbon/fossil free, climate compatible). Sustainab* (connected to economy/society, etc.).
Growth/Development (connected to economy/society, etc.). Transition, scenario, pathway
New economic models
(rights and equity)
Justice, equit*, fairness, moral, ethic*
Rights
Lifestyle changes Lifestyle, behavio*, consum*, education, product, attitude, individual, awareness
The wildcard (*) character means a search for theroot word plus all the terms made by adding letters to the end of it.References
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